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Abstract 
 
The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 has been portrayed in many 
media sources as a liberal democratic revolution, the fulfilment of 
a cultural and societal evolution toward principles embraced in 
the West. Such a portrayal is in the mold of largely debunked 
strains of modernization theory, in which societal development 
and ingenuity has radiated outward from Europe toward the rest 
of the world. In attempting to restore agency to the Egyptian 
people, this thesis advocates a more economic approach, employ-
ing Relative Deprivation Theory to illuminate the cumulative 
grievances of the Egyptian people over time and how they relate 
to their consent to be governed. It explores the evolution of the 
Egyptian economy over time, and the nature by which it im-
pacted the basis of authority for the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak 
regimes. It examines the Muslim Brotherhood as an economic ac-
tor, and sees the election of the Freedom and Justice Party as 
opening a new chapter in the relationship between the people and 
the state. 
 
Die ägyptische Revolution von 2011 wird in den Medien oft als 
liberal-demokratische Revolution beschrieben, als Einlaufen in 
die Zielgrade nach einer kulturellen und sozialen Evolution, hin 
zu einem westlich geprägten Werte- und Normenkanon. Diese 
Logik folgt dem seit langem weitläufig kritisiertem Ansatz der 
Modernisierungstheorie, nach dem gesellschaftliche Entwicklung 
und Erfinderreichtum von Europa in die Welt hinausgetragen 
wurden. Mit dem Ziel, dem ägyptischen Volk eine weitaus wichti-
gere Rolle zuzusprechen, wird in dieser Masterarbeit von einer 
ökonomischen Perspektive ausgegangen. Unter Verwendung der 
„Relative Deprivation Theory“ werden die kumulativen Aufstän-
de der ägyptischen Bevölkerung entlang einer Zeitachse analysiert 
und ihre Bedeutung im Konsens des Regiertwerdens erklärt. Die 
historische Untersuchung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in 
Ägypten soll Aufschluss darüber geben, inwieweit signifikante 
Veränderungen zur Stärkung oder Schwächung der Regime Nas-
ser, Sadat und Mubarak führten. Die „Muslim Brotherhood“ wird 
dabei als wirtschaftlicher Akteur betrachtet, dessen Wahl mit der 
„Freedom and Justice Party“ ein neues Kapitel in der Beziehung 
Staat und Volk aufschlägt.  
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1. First as Tragedy, then as Farce 
 
In early 2005 a series of elections, political agitation, violence, and 
demonstrations across the Middle East led some international 
observers to proclaim the dawn of an “Arab Spring.” The term 
hearkened back to the so-called “Prague Spring” of 1968, in 
which Czechoslovakia embarked on a series of liberalization 
measures intended to increase personal and political freedom as 
well as introduce market-based reforms into the economy – a 
dramatic departure from the prevailing Soviet model. Though it is 
unclear precisely when and where “Arab Spring” originated, by 
March of 2005 American, French, German, and other interna-
tional publications were employing it to suggest a similar level of 
epochal change was occurring in the Middle East.123 “Those who 
claimed,” one editorial began, “that Arabs are an exception to the 
human tendency to freedom … have been proved wrong.”4 
Among Western journalists there was a palpable sense of change 
sweeping across a region often characterized by its political stag-
nation.  
A year later, much of that hope had faded. The Arab 
Spring, it seemed, was destined to share the fate of the movement 
to which it owed its name. Elections in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were marred by accusations of fraud and outbreaks of sectarian 
violence. The so-called “Cedar Revolution” in Lebanon had 
stalled as questions over lingering Syrian influence remained. The 
electoral reform that Hosni Mubarak had promised in Egypt 
proved to be a sham, as the president was successful in pushing 
through a referendum that rendered opposition parties impotent, 
ultimately winning re-election with 88.6% of the vote. As conflict 
persisted and regional strongmen reasserted their authority, pun-
dits were left to re-examine the wreckage of their unfulfilled hy-
potheses.  
With the resurrection of the “Arab Spring” in late 2011, 
Western observers can again be heard proclaiming the arrival of 
freedom and democracy to the Middle East. And yet, despite the 
failure of their 2005 prognostications, the narrative remains the 
 
1 Charles Krauthammer, The Arab Spring of 2005, The Seattle Times, March 21st, 2005; 
accessed July 12th, 2012. 
[http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2002214060_krauthammer21.html] 
2 Guy Sorman, Et si Bush avait raison? Le Figaro, February 26th, 2005; accessed July 
12th, 2012. 
[http://www.lefigaro.fr/cgi/edition/genimprime?cle=20050226.FIG0105] 
3 Claus Christian Malzahn, Could George Bush Be Right? Der Spiegel, February 23rd, 2005; 
accessed July 14th, 2012. 
[http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,343378,00.html] 
4 Charles Krauthammer, The Arab Spring of 2005, The Seattle Times, March 21st, 2005; 
accessed July 12th, 2012. 
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same: the populations of Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria, et al., 
having long toiled under regimes on the wrong end of the linear 
path of development, are now ready to join the ranks of liberal 
democracies. Given the failure of 2005’s Arab Spring to come to 
fruition, it seems prudent to examine the assumptions under 
which such proclamations of change were originally made. 
An oft-stated goal of former US President George Bush’s 
strategy in Iraq was to create an example of democracy to “send 
forth the message that freedom can be the future of every na-
tion.”5 The administration envisioned that the toppling of the 
Hussein dictatorship would produce a domino-effect, whereby 
regional actors would draw inspiration from the Iraqi example 
and ultimately agitate for their own democratic governance. This 
perspective provoked global condemnation from the Arab and 
Western world alike when the US-led invasion created a vacuum 
of instability and violence in the region. It seemed to gain cre-
dence, however, with the green shoots of change during the Arab 
Spring of 2005. Those previously critical of the Bush administra-
tion reassessed their stance and the strategy was, for some, reha-
bilitated.   
“And if Bush Was Right?” began a French editorial, while 
Germany’s der Spiegel referred to “George W. Bush’s Infectious 
Virus [of democracy,]” extolling the (unanticipated) democratic 
consequences of the US invasion on the Middle East.6 In this 
narrative it was not the agency of the Lebanese that expelled the 
Syrian regime from their country, but rather the spectre of the US 
in Iraq. Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer went so 
far as to attribute the extension of suffrage to women in Kuwait, 
Mubarak’s proposed electoral reform, Syrian overtures toward 
the legalization of political parties, and Saudi municipal elections 
to “America’s actions and the breaking of the ice [they] initi-
ated.”7 George W. Bush, perhaps emboldened by these associa-
tions, announced in a speech at the National Defence University 
that “the thaw has begun.”8  
 
5 Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment 
for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington D.C., November 6th, 
2003; accessed July 17th, 2012. 
[http://www.ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-
20th-anniversary] 
6 Claus Christian Malzahn, Democracy at the Tip of a Sword, Der Spiegel, March 3rd, 2005; 
accessed July 14th, 2012. [http://www.spiegel.de/international/democracy-at-the-tip-
of-a-sword-george-w-bush-s-infectious-virus-a-344679.html]  
7 Charles Krauthammer, An Arab Spring? Hoover Digest, Volume 2, March 30th, 2005.  
8 Peter Wallsten and Tyler Marshall, Bush Sees Middle East ‘Thaw’ on Democracy, The Los 
Angeles Times, March 9th, 2005; accessed July 17th, 2012. 
[http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/09/world/fg-bush9] 
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The subsequent freeze revealed the speciousness of such 
cause-and-effect associations. On a superficial level, the connec-
tion between the alleged indicators of 2005’s Arab Spring and US 
activity in the region were tenuous at best. There is little to sug-
gest, for example, that anti-Syrian demonstrations in Lebanon 
were related to anything but the cumulative weight of a decades-
long interference by Syria in Lebanon’s affairs, culminating with 
the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. Similarly, the 
“concessions” by Hosni Mubarak were disingenuous, a thinly 
veiled reform effort aimed at strengthening his stranglehold on 
Egyptian politics, not opening it to contestation out of deference 
to US policy. The same holds true for the Syrian reforms, a fact 
even acknowledged by the same commentators upholding it as 
evidence of US-led change in the region.9  
When approached from its theoretical foundation how-
ever, the objectionable nature of this narrative is more fully ex-
posed. To interpret 2005’s upheavals as an “Arab Spring” owing 
to US actions in Iraq is to subscribe to a worldview most fa-
mously articulated by Samuel Huntington; for Huntington, mod-
ern history is compartmentalized in three democratic waves ema-
nating outward from Europe to all corners of the globe but, as of 
yet, unable to penetrate the Middle East.10 In a similar intellectual 
vein, Francis Fukuyama’s influential The End of History and the Last 
Man touted the triumph of “Western” ideology following the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, speculating that humanity has entered 
the “ … end point of ideological evolution … [with] liberal de-
mocracy as the final form of human government.”11 Within this 
framework, the Middle East, having remained untouched by 
these democratic waves and portrayed as antagonistic to liberal 
ideology, is relegated to a lesser level of human socio-political 
evolution. This dichotomy is implicit even in the term “Arab 
Spring,” which establishes a movement toward democracy whose 
lineage can only be traced back to Europe via the Prague Spring, 
and fraught with the same potential for “failure” (here being any-
thing other than the realization of the historically anointed liberal 
democracy) – a point of clear irritation for participants in the 
2011/12 movement.12  
 
9  Charles Krauthammer, An Arab Spring? Hoover Digest, Volume 2, March 30th, 2005.  
10 Amichai Magen, On Political Order and the Arab Spring, Israel Journal of Foreign Af-
fairs, VI: 1, 2012; accessed 7th August, 2012.  
[http://israelcfr.com/documents/6-1/6-1-2-Magen.pdf] 
11 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, As read on: 
[http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm] 
12 Rami G. Khouri, Drop the Orientalist Term Arab Spring, The Daily Star Lebanon, Au-
gust 17th 2011; accessed 7th August, 2012. 
[http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Columnist/2011/Aug-17/Drop-the-
Orientalist-term-Arab-Spring.ashx#axzz1clXQEC6E] 
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These perspectives are important pillars of modernization 
theory, in which “progress” is a teleological, systematic, and bi-
nary procession toward liberalized democracy, firmly embedded 
in a distinctly Western experience. In this framework, deviation 
from said experience can only be understood as a retreat from 
modernity. It is precisely this paradigm that informed the Mission 
civilisatrice of the colonial era, and justified the imposed steward-
ship of the Middle East, East-Asia, and elsewhere, by European 
powers. Though the language and mechanisms of such steward-
ship have been largely sterilized (the “regime change” of Iraq be-
ing a notable exception), the paradigm is essentially unchanged – 
as evident by the reactions to and expectations of the Arab Spring 
(noted above). The overt occupation of those considered back-
ward has been replaced by the primacy of international institu-
tions such as the IMF and World Bank, whose mandate to assist 
“developing” or “third world” (in contrast to “developed” or 
“first-world) countries is scarcely dissimilar in intent from the co-
lonial administrations of the past.   
Post-colonial theorists, dissatisfied with this global history 
driven solely by European actors, have worked to discredit mod-
ernization theory, arguing that it is Eurocentric and reductionist 
in its inherently binary dichotomy. According to Doreen Massey, 
a viable alternative method of understanding “ … must [involve] 
the existence of trajectories which have at least some degree of 
autonomy from each other (which are not simply alignable into 
one linear story)...[only then does] the existence of alterity begin 
to emerge.13 Similarly, Edward Said confronted the discourse of 
modernization theory as applied to the Middle East, redefining it 
as “Orientalism,” a schema constructed by the West containing 
“a set of constraints upon and limitations of thought … [with] 
the eradicable distinction between Western superiority and Orien-
tal inferiority.”14 This dominant discourse of Orientalism, he ar-
gued, dictated that “ … the Orient and everything in it was, if not 
patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the 
West.”15 He further noted “ … everywhere amongst Orientalists 
[there has been] the ambition to formulate their discoveries, ex-
periences, and insights suitably in modern terms,” so that while 
the terminology of Mission civilsatrice may be passé, the teleology 
of third-to-first world evolution is not. 
Approached from these post-colonial perspectives it is 
possible to account for the lack of democratic governance in the 
Middle East without consigning its population to a pre-modern 
 
13 Doreen Massey, Power Geometries and the Politics of Space-Time, Hettner-Lecture, 
1998, Milton Keynes, United Kingdom.  
14 Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books, October 1979.  
15 Ibid. 
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status, or depriving them of agency in democratic social move-
ments. As applied to the events of 2005, it allows for an interpre-
tation that does not contrive to a predetermined outcome derived 
from the hope, ambition, and experience of the West. Thus, the 
mutation of 2005’s Arab Spring – the turn toward sectarian vio-
lence in Lebanon, electoral fraud in Egypt, repression in Syria – 
can be understood as distinct and evolving trajectories rather than 
failures for having not produced prescribed results.  
Yet it is the language of modernization theory that con-
tinues to be employed in Middle Eastern discourse by Western 
media and governments. When the Arab Spring began anew in 
2011, it was again depicted as a regional progression down a uni-
versal development path. As Egyptian protesters gathered en 
masse in Tahir Square, there was no question about what had 
caused such diverse elements of a fragmented society to bond to-
gether against President Mubarak, but rather a celebration that 
the inevitable evolution of Egyptian society was occurring. That 
there might be varied interests at play, that the protesters were 
not a homogenized entity, and that Egypt may be embarking on a 
unique trajectory – these details were lost in the media adulation 
of a conveniently packaged, familiar story: a repressed people ris-
ing up against a brutal dictator to embrace democracy. But as the 
subsequent electoral results demonstrated, the reality was not so 
easily distilled. Though Egyptians had managed to agree that 
Mubarak must go, there was a serious fragmentation of visions 
for the country’s direction. Western hopes that a unified move-
ment against Mubarak had arisen through the embrace liberal 
democracy proved illusory; several competing claims with varied 
prescriptions for Egypt’s future emerged among the newly 
formed parties. This development raised the question: if it was 
not the absence of democracy that doomed Mubarak, what did?  
 
--- 
 
In the absence of absolute objectivity, a quality rendered 
impossible by our very nature, history is a fundamentally human 
(and thus fallible) construction. For any given event there are a 
multitude of accounts and explanations jockeying amongst each 
other and vying for pre-eminence based on the relative merits of 
their argumentation. Though tangible details can generally (but 
not always) be agreed upon – that there was a conflict, a leader 
deposed, or a government elected, for example – the question of 
how and why are typically much more contested. The narratives 
chosen by an individual or collectively by a society are con-
strained by personal, cultural, and intellectual parameters. Mod-
ernization theory and the discourse of Orientalism are narrative 
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lenses whose compromising subjectivity has been laid bare. They 
are “familiar explanatory strategies and analytic categories with 
which scholars have traditionally worked,” but which “in an age 
of globality” are rendered irrelevant by their “normative construct 
of what some civilization or some intellectuals would want the 
people of this earth to be.”16 
In looking at the how and why of the Egyptian Revolution, 
this thesis will discard the explanatory strategies and analytic cate-
gories of democracy and cultural evolution. It will apply an eco-
nomic perspective to recent Egyptian history, juxtaposing popu-
lar support for Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak with several eco-
nomic indicators. The deterioration of these indicators over time 
and the transformation of the nature of the Egyptian economy 
will be correlated with increasing incidents of dissent against the 
regimes. The evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood as a signifi-
cant economic phenomenon will be explored and their role will be 
contrasted with that of the state apparatus. Their electoral success 
over time will be presented in parallel to their extensive economic 
activities, and the mechanisms by which they filled the void of the 
receding state will be detailed. Prior incidents of economic dissent 
in Egyptian history will be explored to strengthen the argument 
that economic grievances have served to rally Egyptians against 
the regime in the past, and an argument that 2008’s global eco-
nomic recession pushed the regime past the threshold of legiti-
macy will be made. 
 This should not mistook for an attempt to exchange one 
reductionist explanation (that of a narrowly defined pursuit for 
democracy) for another (a reaction to economic grievance).  
Rather, it is an effort to illuminate one variable which can be 
more objectively quantified, measured over time, and correlated. 
The causes and motivations of the revolution are multifaceted 
and complex, and this thesis represents one possible piece of a 
much larger puzzle. As Malcolm Kerr reflected on the Egyptian 
Revolution of 1952,  
 
“To seek [a grand narrative] … is to imagine that the ob-
jectives of the revolution are precisely definable even to 
its leaders … the Egyptian revolution … is still groping 
for a clear sense of its purposes.”17 
 
So, too, is the Egyptian Revolution of 2011. A liberal democracy 
may yet emerge as the direction the revolution proceeds. In the 
 
16 Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, World History in a Global Age, The American 
Historical Review, Volume 100, Issue. 4, October 1995, p. 1037, p. 1059. 
17 Malcolm Kerr, Coming to Terms With Nasser: Attempts and Failures, International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Volume 43, No. 1, January 1967, p. 66. 
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short term, however, the economic grievances of the people re-
main in focus, and the cumulative effect of the aforementioned 
variables indicate that they remain a significant contributing fac-
tor to what instigated the events in Tahrir Square.   
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2. Theoretical Concerns, Methodology, Limitations 
 
The question of what caused the Egyptian Revolution is, at its 
heart, a question of behaviour: why did people mobilize at this 
point of time? As such, a theoretical framework examining and 
explaining the origins of the mobilization is necessary. There are, 
however, several disciplines amongst the social sciences who 
would claim explanatory primacy in this regard. History, for ex-
ample, may contextualize the revolution in explicitly historical 
terms, portraying it as a sort of inertia, the fulfilment of processes 
set in motion long ago. Political Science, on the other hand, 
might explain its origins in the interactions of domestic and in-
ternational institutions. Sociology may put forth cultural or even 
fundamentally human explanations, an observable pattern of reac-
tions by individuals to environmental inputs. Economics might 
theorize that the protesters in Tahrir Square made a rational 
choice, calculating the costs and benefits of their participation in 
the revolution.  
 Each of these notions has merit, but is, ultimately, con-
strained by the walls of the respective discipline. As argued in the 
introduction, the causes of the revolution are multi-faceted, and 
as such, any inquiry requires a multidisciplinary approach. Social 
Movement Theory seems appropriate both in its specificity – it 
seeks to explain why individuals mobilize – but also in its inclu-
siveness; it borrows from all of the social sciences. What is an as-
set is also a weakness however, as the breadth of perspectives 
available is particularly wide, and there is, of course, no consen-
sus.  
 Within Social Movement Theory there are an almost end-
less variety of approaches, with new research constantly emerging 
and vying for pre-eminence. As Jason Bradley DeFay notes in his 
paper “The Sociology of Social Movements,”: 
 
“Some researchers focus their attention on the media and 
its impact on social movement actors, while others look at 
the impact of poverty and social class on the rise of social 
movements. There are yet other scholars who explore 
identity factors and the emergence of new sets of com-
mon interests that unite disparate peoples across great 
physical distances and from different political cultures and 
political systems …”18 
 
 
18 Jason Bradley DeFay, The Sociology of Social Movements, University of California at San 
Diego, Department of Sociology, July 2004; accessed August 14th, 2012. 
[http://defay.org/jason/academic/SM%20Paper.pdf] 
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These varied approaches can be generally distilled into six main 
areas: Mass Society Theory, Resource Mobilization Theory, Struc-
tural-strain Theory, Value-added Theory, Relative Deprivation 
theory, and New Social Movement Theory.19 This paper will 
privilege Relative Deprivation Theory in its analysis of the Egyp-
tian Revolution. 
 
2.1 Relative Deprivation Theory 
 
Relative Deprivation Theory is 
 
“ … the idea that feelings of deprivation and discontent 
are related to a desired point of reference … Feelings of 
relative deprivation arise when desires become legitimate 
expectations and those desires are blocked by society … 
[it] is used to explain the quest for social change that in-
spire social movements; social movements emerge from 
collective feelings of relative deprivation.”20 
 
Put another way, Relative Deprivation Theory can be character-
ized as fuelling social movements through “ … rising expecta-
tions on the one hand and limited capabilities to actualize those 
expectations on the other.” Essentially, when individuals are con-
fronting with situations in which they expect to achieve or receive 
x, but instead achieve or receive y (where y is less in value than x), 
their dissatisfaction increases accordingly. At a certain level of 
dissatisfaction and spread amongst a certain number of people, 
these feelings will coalesce into a social movement directed 
against the perceived source of expectations or provider of insuf-
ficient value.  
The theory gained particular prominence with the publi-
cation of Ted Gurr’s Why Men Rebel in 1970. In his book, Gurr 
argued that social movements arise when there is a “perceived 
discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities” 
(what he terms relative deprivation), and that the strength and 
fervor of a given social movement will reflect the duration and in-
tensity of disparity between these variables.21 He identifies three 
ways in which relative deprivation emerges. The first is “decre-
mentally,” whereby “value expectations remain constant while 
 
19 Simone E. Flynn, Relative Deprivation Theory, Sociology Reference Guide: Theories of 
Social Movements, Salem Press, California, 2011, p. 102. 
20 Ibid., p. 100. 
21 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970, Free Social 
Science Summary Database; accessed August 17th 2012. 
[http://wikisum.com/w/Gurr:_Why_men_rebel] 
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capabilities fall.”22 The second is “aspirationally,” in which “value 
expectations rise while capabilities fall.”23 And the third is “pro-
gressively,” where “ … expectations grow … and capabilities do 
too,” but either at too slow of a pace, or are ultimately curtailed.24 
In addition to these, “ … Gurr identifies four ‘sources’ of 
value expectations: past condition, abstract ideals, standards of a  
leader, and reference groups.”25 In the case of past condition, ex-
pectations are derived from the status and environment the indi-
vidual previously experienced. In abstract ideals, they come from 
the ideology in which the individual adheres to. For standards of 
a leader, expectations are typically articulated by a charismatic 
leader or authoritarian figure. Finally, reference groups refer to 
external individuals or groups for whom the individual feels equal 
to and draws comparisons with.  
Since the publication of Gurr’s work, Relative Depriva-
tion Theory has been applied to several social movements, but 
has also been criticized.26 There are three main criticisms to the 
theory. First, critics contend that “much of the evidence linking 
social movements to feelings of relative deprivation is indirect.”27 
They argue that while there may be a correlation between these 
feelings, there is no absolute proof that they are the impetus to 
join a social movement. The second criticism is that relative dep-
rivation tends to ignore the individual, lumping the grievances of 
individuals into a group, and thus ignoring the spectrum of indi-
vidual feelings and motivations. The third is that grievances and 
feelings of deprivation exist everywhere, and often do not pro-
duce participation in a social movement. Stated otherwise,  
 
“ … [in relative deprivation theory] little consideration is 
given to the notion there may be responses to depriva-
tion-induced frustration other than a collective aggressive 
response. It is instead assumed that there is a critical point 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970, Free Social 
Science Summary Database; accessed August 17th 2012. 
[http://wikisum.com/w/Gurr:_Why_men_rebel] 
24 Ibid. 
25 Joan Neff Gurney, Kathleen J. Tierney, Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A 
Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theoretical Research, The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 
23, No. 1, p. 35. 
26 For one example of its application, see: Kim S. Law, Edward J. Walsh, The Interactions 
of Grievances and Structure in Social Movement Analysis: The Case of JUST, The Sociological 
Quarterly, Volume 24, No. 1, pp. 123-136. 
27 Simone E. Flynn, Relative Deprivation Theory, Sociology Reference Guide: Theories of 
Social Movements, Salem Press, California, 2011, p. 108. 
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beyond which accumulated frustrations explode into re-
volt or revolution.”28 
 
In light of these criticisms, several competing theories within So-
cial Movement Theory have emerged. Perhaps most prominent 
among these is the work of Charles Tilly, in which he reframes 
social movements under the terminology of “contentious poli-
tics.”29 Within Social Movement Theory, Tilly’s work and its ac-
claim seem to represent an intellectual shift; rather than study the 
precise causes of a particular social movement, the emphasis is on 
observation. Tilly’s work creates an extensive lexicon for the study 
of social movements, but seems more oriented toward the explo-
ration of structure and interaction of participants rather than ex-
planation of origins. Such development is in line with the afore-
mentioned criticism, as the unreliable nature of individual testi-
mony and the admitted deficit of causation (only correlation) in 
the relative deprivation approach. Still, this paper argues for the 
relevance of Relative Deprivation Theory in the Egyptian Revolu-
tion, and a 21rst century reimaging of precisely what constitutes 
“relative.” 
 While the theory may not be relevant for all cases, it 
seems particularly well suited for analysing the Egyptian Revolu-
tion. The subsequent details will explore the following factors in 
greater depth, but will be stated here brief. First, this paper views 
the revolution through an economic lens, and it is particularly 
easy to quantify “deprivation” in economic terms. Similarly, “rela-
tive” in this case is easy to identify, as in Egyptian society (as all 
societies) there are clearly identifiable “haves” and “have-nots.” 
Secondly, the classifications used by Gurr – particularly those of 
“aspirational deprivation” and “decrimental deprivation” on the 
expectation side and “past condition” and “standards of a leader” 
on the values side – align well when the revolution is contextual-
ized within the historical economic development of Egypt. Lastly, 
the words of the participants in the revolution make direct assertions 
feeling relative deprivation. It seems only prudent to employ this 
theoretical framework given these factors.  
 Lastly, the concept of “relative” merits updating in the 
21rst century. The Egyptian Revolution did not occur in a vac-
uum; rather it was influenced by social and economic trends – 
most notably the global economic recession of 2008 and the Arab 
Spring – the documentation of which is readily available on an 
 
28 Joan Neff Gurney, Kathleen J. Tierney, Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A 
Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theoretical Research, The Sociological Quarterly, Volume 
23, No. 1, p. 36. 
29 Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics, Oxford University Press, United 
States, 2006.  
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unprecedented level due to developments in media and the inter-
net. Whereas “relative” was once limited to those circumstances 
an individual was in physical proximity to, expectations and value 
sources are now formed in the global arena. When the Arab 
Spring began in Tunisia, it directly impacted the expectations and 
values of Egyptians, and influenced the events that would unfold. 
The concept of relative deprivation then takes on new meaning 
and becomes perhaps more applicable in this particular social 
movement.  
 
2.2 Methodology and Limitations 
 
In exploring the evolving Egyptian economic situation and how it 
correlates to unrest, I began by establishing the relevant time-
frame. 1954 seemed like a logical starting point, as this seemed to 
be the moment that the ruling regime of Egypt – here, Nasser’s 
Free Officers movement – had the acquiescence and support of 
the people. They were, therefore, considered legitimate in some 
form or another. The revolution in 2011 was the end of legiti-
macy by authoritarian rule in Egypt, and thus the entire period in 
between seemed relevant for tracking the four variables in ques-
tion: the economy, the regime, the opposition, and unrest. Ex-
ploring the dichotomy between these illuminates the way in 
which social unrest in Egypt has always been correlated with eco-
nomic performance. I devoted a chapter to how the global eco-
nomic recession in 2008 pushed the populace’s feelings of relative 
deprivation across a point in which it decided that the Mubarak 
regime, due to its inability to deliver value in accordance with 
their expectations, was no longer legitimate.  
 In exploring these topics I various forms of literature and 
testimony: books, magazines, journal articles, and interviews. I 
read each source thoroughly, and attempted to distil how the in-
formation contained within applied to the above variables. I em-
ployed Relative Deprivation Theory (above) to explore how the 
divergence of values from expectations evolved over time until it 
surpassed a threshold that produced the outburst that toppled the 
Mubarak regime.  
 In tracking the economy, I looked at economic indicators 
over time. These indicators include Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Gross National Income (GNP), inflation, wages, wealth 
disparity (gap between the rich and poor), unemployment, and 
food prices. I particularly looked at how these changed in 2008, 
as it was important to answer the question of why the revolution 
happened in 2011, and not, say, 1977, when there was another 
significant incident of protracted unrest (which I cover in chapter 
5).  
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 In all of this, there are some obvious limitations. The first 
of which, not unique to this paper, is that of individual bias. In 
this context I refer not only to the own inherent bias of culture, 
upbringing, political affinities and so on, but also that of research 
bias. At some point in the process of researching the topic I had 
come to the conclusion that it was, in fact, economic processes 
that contributed significantly to the revolution. This conclusion 
therefore guided my additional research and did, it must be ad-
mitted, lead to the omission of other relevant sources of informa-
tion. As I stated in the introduction however, I do not contend 
that economics alone dictated the actions of the people. I only in-
tend to present it was one piece of an infinitely complex story, 
and one that has been underrepresented and insufficiently articu-
lated in much of the existing literature.  
 As second limitation is that of time; while there was am-
ple historical scale to draw upon, the revolution is one that is still 
unfolding. It is still unclear how the tensions between the military 
and the newly elected parliament and president will unfold. The 
question of how the Egyptian people determine the legitimacy of 
their government is, in many ways, bound up in this process. 
Similarly, the economic situation that the Freedom and Justice 
party has inherited has not changed significantly since the ousting 
of the Mubarak regime. If anything, indications are that it has 
gotten worse.30 The premise of this thesis is that the revolution 
was provoked by economic promises by the state that went un-
met by such an extent, and for such duration of time, that the 
people revolted. A large part of that premise rests on the election 
of the Muslim Brotherhood (via the Freedom and Justice Party), 
as they had continuously represented a viable economic alterna-
tive to the state. If, however, the Egyptian economy flounders for 
a prolonged period of time and the Freedom and Justice Party 
remains in power, the premise of this paper may be rightly called 
into question.  
 The last limitation is one of sources and language. As I do 
not speak Arabic, my sources are limited to those written in the 
English language. This produces a sort of “self-selection,” 
whereby I am only able to consult those able and willing to write 
in the language. The ability and desire to do so may, in some 
cases, belie a particular agenda. It was evident for example that 
many of the more liberal elements of the revolution were exploit-
ing their ability to speak or write in English to gain access to 
Western media and promulgate a message they felt that media 
 
30 Michael Schuman, Why the New Egyptian President’s Biggest Worry Could be the Economy, 
Time Magazine Online, June 27th, 2012; accessed August 19th, 2012.  
[http://business.time.com/2012/06/27/why-the-new-egyptian-presidents-biggest-
worry-could-be-the-economy/] 
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would be receptive to. Ultimately, however, this is not an obstacle 
that I am able to overcome. I have attempted to mitigate it by 
both my own recognizance of its existence, and by selecting rely-
ing on Egyptian sources wherever I could. Authors like Alaa Al 
Aswany, Tarek Osman, and Ahdaf Soueif are respected Egyp-
tians, and figure prominently in my sources.  
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3. Contemporary Egyptian Economics Policy: Nasser 
Sadat, and Mubarak 
 
In order to contextualize the cumulative economic grievances of 
the revolution, the actors who articulated them, and the organiza-
tion upon in which the participants have pinned their hope, this 
chapter will provide a macro-overview of contemporary Egyptian 
economic policy. It will begin a brief review of the varied eco-
nomic policies of Egypt prior to the 1952 revolution. Next, the 
transition to a statist planned economy under Gamal Nasser will 
be detailed, followed by the gradual unwinding of these policies 
through al-Infitah by his successor, Anwar Sadat. Finally, the poli-
cies of Hosni Mubarak’s regime will be examined, with particular 
emphasis on the extensive neoliberal reforms that began in ear-
nest in the early 1990’s.  
 
3.1 Pre-Revolution 
 
Prior to the 1952 revolution, Egypt could not be characterized by 
any particular economic doctrine; there had been, over the previ-
ous hundred years, a variety of approaches employed by the re-
gimes in power.31 The state had initially assumed pre-eminence in 
the agricultural sector, though nepotism and land disbursements 
through Muhammad Ali’s familial line had ultimately produced 
large private landholdings. This trend toward privatization was 
nurtured by European intervention in Egyptian affairs in the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, when the economically vogue poli-
cies of free trade were adopted. As the late 19th century’s liberal-
ism gave way to the post-war protectionism however, the gov-
ernment came to assume an increasingly large role in the econ-
omy. This ebb-and-flow process was the result of circumstantial 
expediency however, and not dictated by any particular economic 
or social mandate. 
 
3.2 Nasserism and the Expansion of the State 
 
Though Nasser’s revolution has been retroactively described as 
socialist, “ … [it] was instigated principally by resentment against 
the corruption of the monarchy and frustration … with the Brit-
ish occupation.”32 And indeed, the first years of the revolution 
bore out this doctrinal deficiency: the status quo generally pre-
vailed, and the new regime pursued policies in support of and in 
accordance with existing private sector enterprise and relatively 
 
31 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, New York, 2006. p. 1. 
32 Ibid., p. 1. 
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limited government intervention. One notable exception, how-
ever, was the agrarian reform project of 1952, which sought to 
limit individual agrarian holdings and redistribute land amongst 
the lower classes. The project was a reflection of Nasser’s stated 
intent to “ … build his power base … on a mandate from the 
people … to translate the desires and wants of the people into 
state policies and national socio-economic strategies.”33 Land re-
distribution was immensely popular politically, as “ … land own-
ership lay at the very heart of social inequality in Egypt … ” with 
just .05% of the population owning more than 1/3rd of the farm-
able land by 1950.3435  
The Suez Canal War of 1956 provided the economic im-
petus and popular mandate that produced the dramatic state-
planned restructuring of the Egyptian economy. The origins of 
the war lay in Egypt’s attempted financing of the Aswan High 
Dam. The dam was intended to regulate the flooding of the Nile 
River, allowing for a predictable and regular agricultural cycle, the 
expansion of which was a goal of Nasser. Financing for the dam 
was to be provided by the United Kingdom, United States, and 
the World Bank, but both the UK and US, in accordance with 
Cold War era pressures, sought to attach certain restrictions on 
Egyptian foreign policy to the agreement.36 When Nasser balked 
at these provisions, the UK and US withdrew their bids, followed 
shortly after by the World Bank opting to forego financing of the 
project. In response, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal to raise 
the revenue for the dam’s construction. This move isolated Egypt 
from Western finance markets, necessitating an unprecedented 
level of intervention by the government – a process facilitated 
through the popular mandate earned by the regime’s success in 
the Suez crisis.3738  
 In the aftermath of the Suez Canal War, the Nasser Ad-
ministration 
  
 
33 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink – From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak, Yale 
University Press, London, 2010. p. 54. 
34 Roy Delwin and William Ireland, Law and Economics in the Evolution of Contemporary 
Egypt, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25 No. 2, April 1989, p. 163. 
35 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink – From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak, Yale 
University Press, London, 2010. p. 54. 
36 Malcolm Kerr, Coming to Terms With Nasser: Attempts and Failures, International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), Volume 43, No. 1, January 1967, p. 71. 
37 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, New York, 2006. p. 3. 
38 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink, p. 59: “At that moment in history Gamal Abdel 
Nasser was, in their eyes, doing much more than nationalizing the vital economic asset 
the Suez Canal represented, more than evening the score with yesterday’s powers. He 
was asserting national pride.” 
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“ … [extended] government strategic control … [through] 
tightly planned investment allocations, large-scale nation-
alization, administered pricing, and wage-fixing, as well as 
the controlled foreign trade and resource use in farm-
ing.”39 
 
1956 saw the introduction of the state’s Economic Organization 
department to oversee the management of the newly nationalized 
assets. These first included the British, French, and American, 
and Israeli assets seized during the Suez War, and later included 
other foreign and Egyptian companies, as “ … all banks, insur-
ance, companies, and commercial agencies were required to be 
converted into domestically owned joint stock companies within 
five years.”40 Shortly after, the Nasser regime created the National 
Planning Committee, tasked with establishing highly regimented 
plans for directing the government’s role in managing the econ-
omy. The creation of these two branches represented a definitive 
shift in Egypt’s economic structure, as private enterprise was re-
placed by public management and oversight. The changes were 
significant: in 1952 the public sector was responsible for 28% of 
gross investment in the Egyptian economy; by 1960 that number 
had ballooned to 74%, reaching a peak of 90% by 1973.41 The 
National Charter of 1962 (al-Mithaq al Witany) expressed the ra-
tionale for the decisive change, emphasizing prior “market fail-
ures,” and tasking the government with providing 
 
“ … access of all citizens to free education and health 
services, the provision of cheap housing to working 
classes and the elimination of exploitation in transactions 
[through] the public sector, regulating wage rates and sub-
sidizing consumer prices … [as well as] guaranteed em-
ployment of graduates …  ”42 
 
To this end, the government engaged in a sustained nationaliza-
tion push to enable the mobilization of all necessary assets and 
income. In 1961 the Alexandria Cotton Market was closed and 
replaced by the state-controlled Cotton Authority, all remaining 
banks and insurance companies were liquidated, 44 companies in 
material industries taken over, the capital of 86 manufacturing 
 
39 M. Riad El-Ghonemy, Egypt in the Twenty-First Century – Challenges for Development, 
Routledge Curzon, New York, 2003. p. 76. 
40 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, New York, 2006. p. 5. 
41 Ibid., p. 5. 
42 M. Riad El-Ghonemy, Egypt in the Twenty-First Century – Challenges for Development, 
Routledge Curzon, New York, 2003. p. 77. 
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firms seized as well as the shares of 147 firms – moves that 
placed an additional two-thirds of the country’s capital in gov-
ernment hands.43   
  Thus, the transition from what had been at the outset of 
the revolution an economy dominated mostly by the private sec-
tor, to a state-planned centralized socialist economy was com-
plete. Though the revolution had not been fuelled by ideological 
socialism, international circumstances combined with the domes-
tic political benefits of egalitarianism were increasingly expressed 
in Nasser’s restructuring program. As Nasser’s ambition to raise 
the average Egyptian from poverty were incorporated into the 
five-year plans of the Economic Organization department, the 
government took on additional functions, including: increased 
predominance in agriculture, an “ … extensive system of cost and 
price controls … to improve income distribution and resource 
mobilization,” cost of living regulations, minimum wage hikes, 
increased health-care expenditures, investment in public educa-
tion, and on-going land reform that shifted ownership of 57% of 
the land to the lowest end of the income scale.44 
 The cumulative effect of these policies was, on a social 
level, an unprecedented resource redistribution and intervention 
on behalf of the Egyptian lower classes. The redistribution is best 
illustrated through the evolution of Egypt’s middle class: 
 
“At the time of the fall of the Egyptian monarchy in the 
early 1950s, the Egyptian middle class comprised roughly 
4 million people (in a population of 21 million, of which 
17 million were considered lower class and poor, and less 
than half a million upper class and rich) … Nasser 
changed that … [by] flattening the social curve; millions 
of previously poor Egyptians, through education and jobs 
in the public sector, joined the middle class.”45 
 
This dramatic expansion of the middle class mitigated the seeth-
ing class tensions in society prior to the revolution, typified by the 
1951 riots in Behout in which poor peasants, angered over work-
ing conditions and high rents, attacked the properties of the Al-
Badrawis, one of Egypt’s wealthiest families.46 Though Nasser’s 
lustre faded following Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, 
and the Egyptian economy grew increasingly stagnant as re-
 
43 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, New York, 2006. p. 7. 
44 Ibid., p. 9.  
45 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink – From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak, Yale 
University Press, London, 2010. p. 132.  
46 Ibid., p. 46. 
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sources were directed toward the military, his resonance with the 
masses persisted: 2 ½ million people filled the streets of Cairo in 
protest when he was briefly forced to step down as terms of the 
peace treaty.47 
 
3.3 Sadat’s al-Infitah 
 
Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser after the latter’s sudden death in 
1970. The Egyptian economic situation had deteriorated follow-
ing defeat in the 1967 war with Israel; foreign aid was reduced, oil 
revenues plummeted following the loss of the Sinai fields, and 
disproportionate investment in the military at the expense of 
other productive sectors began to take its toll on the state’s fi-
nances. Before his death, Nasser began to question the efficacy of 
the state-led planned economic strategy, but ultimately neglected 
to make any significant changes.48 By the end of Nasser’s reign, it 
became clear that  
 
“ … Egypt’s aims greatly exceeded its means. It could not 
afford to maintain a military confrontation with Israel, to 
prosecute a war in Yemen, to act as a leader of the ‘non-
aligned’ group of countries, to champion the anti-colonial 
movement in Africa, to set up a welfare state with guaran-
teed employment and free access to education and health-
care, and at the same time antagonize the Western coun-
tries and the West-dominated international financial insti-
tutions that were the chief sources of concessional capital 
and of modern technology.” 49 
 
The price of these endeavours vastly exceeded the productivity of 
the state’s economic enterprises and tax base. As a result, the 
government was forced to rely on borrowing to finance its ex-
penditures. This increased borrowing coincided with inflationary 
pressures both at home and abroad, which in turn increased the 
cost of price-control and subsidy programs: in 1974 the Egyptian 
price indices rose between 20 and 25%, while the costs incurred 
by the state with these programs reached $1.26 billion (or nearly 
30% of the state’s expenditures).50 This strained the overall 
budget, producing a budget deficit of 22% in 1975.51 The state 
 
47 Peter Johnson, Egypt Under Nasser, MERIP Reports, No. 10, July 1972, p. 9.  
48 Hamza Ates, Mehmet Duman, and Yuksel Bayraktar, A Story of Infitah: Egyptian Liber-
alization Under Stress, Yapi Kredi Economic Review, Volume 17, No. 1, June 2006, p. 62. 
49 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, New York, 2006. p. 13. 
50 Ibid., p. 14. 
51 Ibid., p. 15.  
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eased monetary policy to mitigate the budget deficit, but this ac-
tion increased the cost of imports, a disastrous consequence at a 
time when demand for Egypt’s exports was particularly low. This 
disparity produced a balance of payments crisis, and by 1975 
Egypt’s current account deficit reached 1.4 billion. To balance 
this, Egypt was forced to rely even further on short-term credit, 
the high interest rates of which produced such a burden that by 
1975 these debt obligations consumed “the entire proceeds of 
Egypt’s estimated exports” and the annual foreign aid contribu-
tion of Arab countries.52 Thus, in speech addressing Egypt’s eco-
nomic predicament, Sadat stated: 
 
“Let me tell you that our economy has fallen below zero. 
We have commitments (to the banks, and so on), which 
we should but cannot meet by the end of the year. In 
three months’ time … we shan’t have enough bread in the 
pantry!”53 
 
It was this recognition that led Sadat to implement a se-
ries of reforms dubbed al-Infitah (the opening), the content of 
which he outlined in his October Working Paper of 1974. The 
premise of the working paper was institutionalized by Law 43, 
passed in 1974, that called for  
 
“ … the opening up of the Egyptian economy to foreign 
investment, protection of investment against nationaliza-
tion and confiscation, tax exemption for new investment, 
covering varying periods depending on the field of activ-
ity and the recognition that private companies would not 
be subject to legislation or regulations covering public 
sector enterprises and their employees.”54  
 
These policies were intended to remedy Egypt’s balance of pay-
ment issues by stimulating commercial activity and exports 
through the attraction of foreign investment via the private sec-
tor. To this end, the government implemented reforms in indus-
try, agriculture, and finance. In industry, this paved the way for 
privatisation by “permitting foreigners to have total ownership of 
specific [industrial] projects and to own up to 49 percent of 
[state-owned enterprises].55 Similarly, in agriculture the state rein-
 
52 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, New York, 2006. p. 16. 
53 Ibid., p. 13. 
54 Hamza Ates, Mehmet Duman, and Yuksel Bayraktar, A Story of Infitah: Egyptian Liber-
alization Under Stress, Yapi Kredi Economic Review, Volume 17, No. 1, June 2006, p.62.  
55 Ibid., p. 63.  
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troduced the purchase of land by private individuals, and in fi-
nance eased restrictions on investment in an effort to woo for-
eign capital. In touting the success of these moves, the Sadat re-
gime emphasized the improving GDP growth, which increased 
by 13% in 1975-1978, as opposed to 4% in 1967-1974 (Fig. 1, be-
low).56  
 
Fig. 157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, despite the alleged shift away from the explicit in-
vestment in people (as embodied by Nasser’s rhetoric) and toward 
structure as represented by Sadat’s economic opening, social indi-
cators reflected improvement for the masses: 
 
“The number of absolute poor rural households declined 
from 51 percent in the early 1970s to 30 percent by the 
early 1980s; the infant mortality rate declined from 117 
per thousand to 93; life expectancy at birth rose from 50 
to 58 years; the average caloric intake per capita increased 
from 100 to 128 percent of minimum standard require-
ments; and the primary school enrolment ratio improved 
from 72 to 78 percent.”58 
 
 
56 Ibid., p. 64.  
57 Statistics Obtained from Google Public Data Explorer. Accessed August 15, 2012. 
[http://www.google.com/publicdata/directory] 
58 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, New York, 2006. p. 25. 
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The GDP growth and social indicator results were pri-
marily the result of three external macroeconomic factors how-
ever, and not attributable to a liberal shift in Egypt’s economic 
structure. First, following the war with Israel in 1973, Egypt’s 
stalled oil production resumed, producing a windfall of oil reve-
nue following the price spikes of 1973 and 1979 (Fig. 2, below).  
 
Fig. 259 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secondly, the associated growth of the oil industry in nearby Arab 
states prompted an outflow of Egyptian labor to these countries. 
This was important as it both relieved demographic pressure and 
led to an influx of foreign currency via worker’s remittances (Fig. 
3, p. 16). Lastly, an increase in external aid served as protective 
buffer for Egypt’s debt obligations. In 1976 the Gulf Organiza-
tion for the Development of Egypt was created by Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar, and provided Egypt with imme-
diate cash assistance to service their short-term debt.60 When this 
organization cut funding after Egypt’s signing of the Camp David 
Peace Accords with Israel in 1978, Western institutions and coun-
try-specific AID programs replaced the GODE’s contributions.61 
The combined effect of these three factors – oil revenues, work-
 
59 Inflation Data, Historical Crude Oil Prices, 1946-Present, June 2012. 
[http://inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate/historical_oil_prices_table.asp] 
60 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
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Cambridge, 2009, p. 108. 
$0.00 
$20.00 
$40.00 
$60.00 
$80.00 
$100.00 
$120.00 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Annual Average Domestic Crude Oil Prices 
U.S. Average
Nominal
Inflation Adjusted
 26 
 
ers remittances, and foreign aid – accounted for 24% of Egypt’s 
GDP in 1980, as opposed to merely 3% in 1970.62  
  
 
Fig. 363 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As state revenues increased and balance of payment pressures 
waned, so too did the impetus for real structural reform. The Sa-
dat regime found it prudent to maintain its extensive investment 
in the public sector, primarily through government employment, 
welfare, and increasingly expensive subsidies. The policy of guar-
anteeing employment to new graduates that began during Nas-
ser’s era was continued, and throughout Sadat’s reign 40% of 
Egypt’s entire work force was employed in the public sector.64 A 
brief flirtation with IMF-influenced subsidy cuts was abruptly 
scrapped in the aftermath of massive riots in Cairo in 1977, the 
scale of which prompted a renewed dedication by the regime to 
the statist policies. This was perhaps best typified by the National 
Democratic Party’s (established in 1978) slogan “food for every 
mouth and a house for every citizen.”65  
Therefore, throughout the Sadat regime there remained a 
tension between the expressed desire for economic liberalisation, 
and the regime’s actions that tended to reinforce the statist poli-
 
62 Ibid, p. 108. 
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cies established during Nasser’s reign. This ideological contradic-
tion was acknowledged in the regime’s 1978-82 plan: 
 
“More and more young people and workers perceive the 
contradictions of a socialist society which thinks with a 
capitalist mind, which takes from socialism and commu-
nism the concepts of public ownership, dominance of the 
public sector, guaranteed employment, education, ser-
vices, and social security … it has not adopted from the 
capitalist system the stringency of market competition … 
The end result of a society lacking in discipline or super-
vision, distribution without production, promises without 
obligations, freedom without responsibility.”66  
 
Sadat’s legacy then “was an unreformed public sector and 
a liberalized foreign-trade sector.”67 There was appreciable 
growth in both economic and social indicators, and private activ-
ity did increase. The middle class – the object of Nasser’s reforms 
– languished, however. The bulk of their employment lay in the 
public sector, and the demographic explosions of the 1950’s and 
60’s swelled their ranks, precluding any real increase in salaries; 
this stagnancy in purchasing power was exacerbated by the era’s 
monetary inflation.68 The new opportunities afforded by the legis-
lative changes of al-Infitah seemed to be primarily exploited by 
those closest to them; namely, those in the government who 
oversaw the influx of capital flows from oil revenues, managed 
the land purchasing programs, or former ministers newly ap-
pointed to managerial positions within the semi-privatised indus-
tries– a phenomena referred to as “crony capitalism.” This cre-
ated a new class of elites in Egyptian society. Just as Nasser’s 
coup and subsequent reforms swept away the monarchy and di-
luted the large landholding agrarian elites, al-Infitah too redistrib-
uted the wealth and opportunities available:  
 
“At the center of al-Infitah’s new elite, closest to the re-
gime, were former military and intelligence officers – 
many of whom were simultaneously playing a number of 
roles (as associates of influential security organisations, 
leaders of semi-government companies, businessmen, and 
entrepreneurs, members of parliament) … [including 
 
66 Khalid Ikram, The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000: Performance Policies and Issues, Routledge 
Studies in Middle Eastern Economics, New York, 2006, p. 58. 
67 Paul Rivlin, Arab Economies in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009, p. 109. 
68 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink – From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak, Yale 
University Press, London, 2010, p. 132. 
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those] who siphoned their capital to Europe in the first 
few years of Nasser’s era …[many] sensing the changes as 
a result of al-Infitah, returned to Egypt … the result was 
many business partnerships … between men who, a few 
years earlier, had been ardent socialists and Nasserites.”69 
 
 Twenty years of Nasser’s socialism had left Egypt lacking 
the labor and intellectual capital to immediately assume competi-
tiveness in the free market environment al-Infitah fostered. There-
fore the transition was, by necessity, largely managed by members 
of the regime. As these individuals transitioned to an ostensibly 
private role, they emerged as a new elite class that was loyal to the 
government. In exchange for their support they were the benefi-
ciary of policies that supported them, under the mandate of liber-
alizing and privatising the Egyptian economy. This development, 
coupled with the enduring strength of the military (augmented in-
creasingly by US military aid) and the aforementioned stagnation 
of the public sector, produced a socioeconomic rigidity whereby 
growth was disproportionately obtained by these new elite. The 
masses did receive auxiliary benefits from the development of 
certain industries (like transportation, for example) and by a con-
tinued redirection of revenues into public welfare programs, but 
this spending increasingly came under pressure by the interna-
tional institutions that financed Egypt’s debt following the drop 
in oil prices and associated economic downturns. Sadat’s admini-
stration had largely refused to cut public spending, but the subse-
quent administration was ultimately forced to comply with such 
measures. 
 
3.4 Staying the Course: Mubarak’s Gradualism 
 
Hosni Mubarak ascended to the position of Prime Minister fol-
lowing the assassination of Sadat in 1981. Though the early years 
of his rule were characterized by deteriorating economic indica-
tors (primarily a function of the declining gas prices and the ab-
sence of compensatory exports), they witnessed “few economic 
reforms with long-term effects.”70 The situation became increas-
ingly precarious however, as “petroleum export prices plummeted  
from an average of $33.60 per barrel … in 1981 to $14.29 per 
 
69 Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink – From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak, Yale 
University Press, London, 2010, p. 135. 
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barrel in 1987.”71 This decline in oil price paralleled the decline in 
Egypt’s GDP growth during this era (depicting in Fig. 4 on page 
20). This decline in GDP was not countered by budget cuts; 
rather, the government continued to spend at the same right, ac-
cruing a greater ratio of debt-to-GDP during these years. This 
produced an acute debt crisis in 1988, in which Mubarak was 
forced to enter into extensive discussions with the IMF and con-
cede to implement the sort of policy recommendations that had, 
to that point, been resisted: 
 
“In May 1987, following long negotiations with the IMF, 
the government adopted a partial stabilization package … 
steps were taken to reduce [the] budget deficit of 11.3 per 
cent of GDP in 1981-85 and 16 per cent in 1987-90 
through budgetary cuts, including the removal of non-
food subsidies (electricity, fuel and transport), and the re-
duction of food subsidies from 10 per cent of the national 
income in 1981 to only 2.5 per cent in 1990.”72 
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Fig. 574 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the agreement, the program was only partially 
implemented. The regime’s reluctance to fully implement the 
IMF’s recommendations stemmed in part from the 1977 Cairo 
riots, the implications of which – a ferocious reaction to the 
threat of subsidy reductions – remained at the forefront of poli-
cymakers’ minds.75 This fear of unrest in the face of public spend-
ing cuts was manifested in Mubarak’s reaction to the IMF’s pre-
scription-based assistance, as stated in 1988: 
 
“ … I tell the IMF that economic reform should proceed 
according to the social and economic situation in the state 
and according to the people’s standard of living. One 
should not come and say increase the price by 40 percent. 
Surely, no one will be able to live. This will not be an IMF 
process: it will be a slaughter.”76  
 
The regime acknowledged the structural deficiencies of Egypt’s 
economy, but fearing the social repercussions, preferred a 
“gradualist” approach rather than a “big bang” change.77 Still, by 
1991 the budget deficit had become unsustainable. In 1991 the 
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Mubarak regime reached an agreement with the IMF and World 
Bank. The agreement, titled “Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program” (ESRAP), 
  
“ … aimed at stabilizing the economy and starting struc-
tural reform … it [focused] on both the external accounts 
and budgetary deficit, focusing especially on the links be-
tween the two.”78  
 
The ESRAP covered all facets of the Egyptian economy, and in-
cluding privatization measures, the banking and financial sectors, 
expenditures, budgets, and exchange rates. Two big impacts of 
the ESRAP stand out, however. First, “ … a part of the labor 
force in public enterprises that were privatized would likely be 
made redundant.”79  This meant that in the short term, at least, 
the package would produce an increase in unemployment. The 
second was the decrease in expenditures. This was felt almost 
immediately, as “ … budgetary expenditures were cut by 7.5 per-
cent of GDP between 1992 and 1997. The main items of reduced 
expenditures were public investment, subsidies, and foreign 
loans.”80 Subsidy reductions comprised 3.6% of the GDP reduc-
tion, and reduced existing staple subsidies to bread, wheat, flour, 
and cooking oil.81  
 The impact of these reductions will be explored in later 
chapters, but they cannot be underestimated. Full employment 
and subsidies had been a staple of the Egyptian system since 
Nasser came to power; their government’s willingness to concede 
them in negotiations with the IMF was both in recognition of the 
extent of economic problem, as well as a dramatic departure from 
the policies of the previous administrations.  
 The ESRAP significantly liberalized the Egyptian econ-
omy to an unprecedented extent. In the years following its im-
plementation, GDP growth accelerated and foreign investment 
exceeded any previous level. The economic benefits of these 
changes were disproportionate, however, and the lower and mid-
dle classes increasingly felt pinched. The agricultural sector de-
clined, and people increasingly moved to cities to seek work. Un-
employment increased as publicly owned operations were privat-
ized and jobs were cut for the sake of efficiency. The government 
continued to be an employer of last resort, but attempts main-
taining a steady exchange-rate produced inflation. By and large, 
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the ESRAP had produced the desired macro-economic effects, 
but on a micro-level, the population was not enriched.  
 
 
3.5 Summary of the Three Regimes 
 
The economic policies of the three reigns departed significantly 
from each other. Nasser came to power without any stated eco-
nomic ambition, but gradually transitioned to a socialist system 
with explicit investment in egalitarian principles. Sadat inherited 
this system, but was saddled with budgetary short-falls and a 
global economic situation that necessitated changes to remain 
sustainable. Thus al-Infitah was born, which shifted the Egyptian 
economy toward a more liberalized direction in the attempt to at-
tract foreign investment. The food riots of 1977 limited the re-
gime’s willingness to continue down that path, however, and the 
state-dominated economy remained largely intact.  
After Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak was impelled 
to complete the shift toward a liberalized open economy due to 
significant budgetary shortfalls. After an agreement with the IMF 
and World Bank, the ESRAP guided a dramatic restructuring of 
the Egyptian economy. Growth was attained, but prosperity 
eluded the vast majority of Egyptians. This result had dire conse-
quences for the regime, and would ultimately be its downfall.  
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4. The Muslim Brotherhood as an Economic Actor 
 
In Egypt’s 2005 parliamentary elections – the first following the 
2005 electoral reforms of the Mubarak regime and in which Mus-
lim Brotherhood candidates were able to openly campaign more 
than ever before – the Muslim Brotherhood won 88 seats, or 
20% of the People’s Assembly of Egypt. This result came despite 
a wave of repression and voter intimidation in which  
 
“ … gangs of thugs from the ruling National Democratic 
Party blockaded access to dozens of polling sites … 
opened fire on citizens who tried to vote … blatantly 
stuffed ballet boxes in full view of judicial monitors … 
[and] ignored court orders seeking to prevent them from 
buying votes or bussing in non-residents to defeat opposi-
tion candidates.”82  
 
In short, the regime did all it could to ensure its dominance, and 
yet the Muslim Brotherhood was able to procure 20% of parlia-
mentary seats. Nor was the choice a binary one; in addition to 
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brother-
hood (running as independents), five other political parties were 
represented in the election. Following heavy repression in 2010’s 
elections, the success was duplicated in 2011’s first post-Mubarak 
elections in which the Muslim Brotherhood, under the banner of 
the Freedom and Justice Party, won 37.5% of the available seats, 
as well as the presidency. Thus, from the moment Egyptian elec-
tions became relatively open and contested – they had previously 
produced results of over 75% for the ruling party – the Muslim 
Brotherhood received heavy support from the population. 
Though this has been heralded by some as symptomatic of 
Egypt’s a turn toward radicalism, one Muslim Brotherhood voter 
articulated a more innocuous reason for their success: “they help 
with expensive things.”83  
Nawal Sleem’s statement was recorded at a Muslim 
Brotherhood operated market in a poor Cairo neighborhood, 
where prices “were about half price compared [to regular mar-
kets].”84 The market is one of many that the Muslim Brotherhood 
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operates in Egypt, and is part an extensive socioeconomic net-
work that includes schools, hospitals, and other social services, as 
well as an estimated 20% of NGOs in the country.85 It is the wal-
let then, as much as the mosque, which is responsible for famil-
iarizing the Egyptian people with the Muslim Brotherhood. Their 
preference for a party whose execution in the economic realm 
surpassed (and replaced) that of the state is a testimony to the 
role of Egypt’s deteriorating economy in 2011’s revolution. The 
Muslim Brotherhood’s charitable efforts did not begin as strategy 
to secure votes, however. The organization has over ninety years 
of history as an economic actor within Egypt, and this chapter 
will explore its development in parallel to the three authoritarian 
regimes. 
The Muslim brotherhood was founded by Hasan al-
Banna in Isma’iliya, Egypt, in March of 1928. After moving to 
Cairo in 1932, the organization expanded rapidly, opening 300 
branches and having an estimated 50,000 to 150,000 members by 
1938.86 From its very founding the organization was philan-
thropic in nature, devoted to “mutual aid” and “building a social 
service organization.”87 Al-Banna believed that the Egypt of the 
early 20th century was suffering from an acute illness, and that 
Muslims could “find strength in the total self-sufficiency of Is-
lam.”88 His language was couched in the terms of anti-
imperialism, as the British occupation of Egypt was the single 
largest political issue of the time. To demonstrate that objective 
within the framework of Islam, al-Banna used his organization to 
create “medical clinics, hospitals, charitable societies, cultural as-
sociations, and schools … to display [how] Islam fit into … eve-
ryday life.”89 
Though it would be disingenuous to claim that al-Banna 
was consciously counteracting a prevailing economic system or 
advocating a particular strand of economic thought, the imprint 
of socialism is visible in many of his statements and initiatives. 
His critique of Western society made reference to its “[crumbling] 
economic foundations,” while he lamented the “exploitation of 
[Egyptian] resources and natural treasures,” and aimed to repre-
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sent all “the diverse masses.”90 Thus, from the very outset, an im-
portant ideological pillar of the Muslim Brotherhood was egali-
tarianism and outreach to those marginalized by the economy.  
As the Egyptian public was increasingly mobilized against 
British occupation, the Brotherhood entered the political realm. 
They organized support for the Arab strike in Palestine, mobiliz-
ing funds and recruiting individuals to send in the effort. By 1941 
they had fielded candidates in elections under an explicitly anti-
British platform, which chaffed imperial authorities and resulted 
in al-Banna being expelled from Cairo. As Britain’s attention 
turned toward the war effort, al-Banna regrouped, and the by 
1949 “the organization had over two thousand branches 
throughout Egypt and between 300,000 and 600,000 active 
members – the largest organized force in the country.”91 Al-
Banna would not live to see its entrenchment into Egypt’s politi-
cal life, however. Following the assassination of the monarchy’s 
Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi by a Muslim Broth-
erhood member, al-Banna himself was assassinated by the Egyp-
tian police force.  
Following these incidents, the Brotherhood was banned 
from Egyptian society for the second time. They experienced a 
brief reprieve with the coup in 1952, as many of Nasser’s fellow 
officers were either Brotherhood members or sympathetic to the 
cause, but this was short-lived. During Nasser’s ensuing consoli-
dation of power a Brotherhood member made an attempt on his 
life, provoking a brutal crackdown on the organization that saw 
the imprisonment, torture, and execution of several key leaders, 
as well as a total ban within Egyptian social, political, and reli-
gious life. This began the five-decade long antagonistic relation-
ship between the ruling regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak 
and the Muslim Brotherhood.  Rather than wage an underground 
campaign of violence however, the organization focused their 
message, shifting their critique from the illegitimacy and failures 
of Western rule to that of the authoritarian regimes. As before, 
their target was not of oppression or the absence of democratic 
ideals, but rather poverty, inequality, and the failure to provide 
for the masses. As such, a critical element of their anti-
establishment message and appeal was rooted in fundamentally 
economic activities.    
 As detailed in chapter two, Nasser regime pursued a so-
cialist policy, and the state intervened directly in the economy to 
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fulfil his stated goals of uplifting the Egyptian people from pov-
erty. In light of this restructuring, one might suspect the appeal of 
the Muslim Brotherhood would diminish, as their charitable ac-
tivities would be in less demand as the state redistributed its re-
sources. This was, however, not the case, as the state’s efforts 
were either ineffective or insufficient. The Brotherhood’s activi-
ties continued unabated, and  
 
“State department records indicate … the system was so 
large that the government was forced to fund and con-
tinue staffing [their] extensive network of services after 
the organization was dissolved by al-Nasser in 1954 for 
fear that their collapse would lead to widespread unrest.”92  
 
This excerpt establishes two important things: first, as early as 
1954 the Muslim Brotherhood had assumed a vital role in the 
economic activity of the state, and second that the government 
drew a correlation between social welfare programs and unrest. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, then, emerged as both a contributor to 
Egyptian stability, and a threat to the regime. Their   
 
“ … public works brought millions of Egyptians into con-
tact with the organization and its ideology … [and] cre-
ated an institutional infrastructure in which [they] could 
demonstrate its ability to deliver on promises of social 
and economic change to the Egyptian population.”93 
 
As Nasser’s regime evolved, he staked its legitimacy on its in-
vestment in the people. The ideological corner-stone, as embod-
ied in the National Charter of 1962, bore significant resemblance 
to the message of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
The National Charter of 1962 intended to grant 
 
“ … access of all citizens to free education and health 
services, the provision of cheap housing to working 
classes and the elimination of exploitation in transactions 
[through] the public sector, regulating wage rates and sub-
sidizing consumer prices … [as well as] guaranteed em-
ployment of graduates …  ”94 
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While the Muslim Brotherhood sought to “reform” society 
through “outreached focused on [impoverished] neighborhoods 
based on the need for aspects of societal advancements, such as 
adequate schools, hospitals, and youth clinics,” to appeal to ‘all 
social classes,” as well as end the “exploitation” of the Egyptian 
people.95  
 
The similarity of these messages is particularly striking when one 
considers that Nasser did not come to power under this rhetoric, 
but adopted it later as he consolidated his power. It is reasonable 
to conclude that his restructuring of the economy and attempt to 
redistribute its resource were in recognizance of the Brother-
hood’s enduring popularity, and the reasons for that popularity: 
the subsidizing of health, food, and education, all three of which 
the regime soon copied. The importance of these measures are 
reflected in a state department memo indicating the counter-
propaganda actions the government took against the Brother-
hood, in which plain-clothes officers would enter mosques led by 
Muslim Brotherhood Sheikhs and “[point] up the Regime’s pro-
jects for the good of the people.”96  
 With their defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the re-
sources of the regime dwindled, and when Anwar Sadat suc-
ceeded Nasser as president, he was confronted by the fact that he 
did not possess the means to continue the extensive social pro-
grams of Nasser. In light of this, Sadat attempted to co-opt the 
popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood by easing its persecution 
and integrating them within the public sector. From the Brother-
hood’s perspective,  
 
“ … the end of Nasser’s era was marked with economic 
recession, military defeat, and political crisis, providing 
[them] with the ideal setting to parade into the political 
scene … the formerly silent population found its voice 
through the reaction against the regime’s failures to de-
liver what had been promise to it …”97 
 
Sadat faced a crisis of legitimation; Nasser’s reign and economic 
programs had established that the basis of its legitimacy was in 
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supplying for the people, but he faced a situation in which he was 
no longer able to do so, and there was, in the Brotherhood, a vi-
able alternative. That left-wing opposition had gained steamed in 
Egypt was a testament to this hinge upon which legitimacy rested, 
and the expectations of the population. The Brotherhood had  
  
“ … proved themselves capable in meeting both the po-
litical and economic problems … including the lack of 
economic development, the need to modernize the infra-
structure, and the desire to extend the basic social and po-
litical freedoms.”98 
 
Sadat’s welcoming of the Brotherhood back into the mainstream 
did not last long, however. It was increasingly evident the extent 
to which the organization represented a threat to his power, and 
he was soon pressured to act. He “began to arrest and ban official 
publications for publicly criticizing his regime,” and further tight-
ened the screws on the Brotherhood, arresting members, and 
placing the control of over 40,000 mosques in state hands.99 The 
zeitgeist of the era was stacked against Sadat: both economic and 
geopolitical trends were against him, as a religious revitalization 
worked in conjunction with a deteriorating economy to sway 
converts to the message that Islam – and not the ruling regime – 
could improve people’s lives.  
 In the 1980’s, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to 
make in-roads among Egyptians, as inflation caused “state enti-
tlements … to lose value,” and there was a “migratory tendency 
toward ‘non-political’ groups and organizations.”100 In this envi-
ronment, the National Democratic Party’s slogan of “Food for 
every mouth,” lost resonance, as it was the Muslim Brother-
hood’s markets, and not state subsidies, which the poor increas-
ingly turned toward. The poor were not the only ones whose 
support was lost in lieu of the state’s failure to act on its promise, 
however. As Hosni Mubarak came to power, young professionals 
were turning toward Muslim Brotherhood membership as a way 
for personal and professional advancement in a society unable to 
provide for such.  
The failure of one policy in particular can help to explain 
this phenomenon. Since Nasser’s reign, a pillar of the regime’s 
social program was the guarantee of full employment to all uni-
versity graduates. Though the program was never intended to be 
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permanent, the inability for the private sector to create new jobs 
– and the government’s fear of unrest stemming from unem-
ployment – necessitated its extension. As noted on page 18 and 
19, the demographic explosion of the 60’s and 70’s swelled the 
ranks of those employed by the government, limiting opportuni-
ties and creating redundancies. This was exacerbated by inflation 
and the cuts to entitlements, both of which decreased the earn-
ings of public sector employees in real terms. Between 1973 and 
1986, the wages of government employees collapsed, falling more 
than 55%.101  
As the ranks of those eligible for employment far ex-
ceeded the availability of jobs, “individuals graduating with col-
lege degrees [were forced] to accept jobs traditionally associated 
with a different social class.”102 Furthermore, “the number of 
graduates increased by 7.4% each year between 1976 and 1986, 
[while] the labor force grew only 2.2%.”103 The Mubarak regime 
eventually modified the guarantee, increasing the time from 
graduation to employment, intending to ease the strain on the 
system. In practice, however, this merely produced graduates who 
endured a limbo period where they could not find jobs in the pri-
vate sector, nor were they able to be employed by the govern-
ment. This fomented dissatisfaction within the ranks of individu-
als typically less inclined to join opposition movements – the 
educated middle class. In short, the 
 
“ … overextension of the Egyptian state system of popu-
list entitlements … created an ‘aggravated constituency 
available for mobilization by Islamic groups … the state’s 
continued unresponsive nature in dealing with the prob-
lems of chronic unemployment offered an opening to the 
Muslim Brotherhood to capitalize on the misfortune of 
the people of Egypt who were suffering both at the hands 
of the economy and the government’s unwillingness to 
mend the matter.’104 
 
Seeking to exploit the disparity between the regime’s 
promises and what they were able to deliver, the Brotherhood 
became increasingly active on university campuses during Muba-
rak’s rule. With increased involvement and recruitment on cam-
puses, the Brotherhood gained an important foothold in the pro-
 
101 Michelle Paison, The History of the Muslim Brotherhood: The Political, Social, and Economic 
Transformation of the Arab Republic of Egypt, New Initiative For the Middle East Peace, 
March 31st, 2009, Tufts University, p. 18. 
102 Ibid., p. 18. 
103 Ibid., p. 18. 
104 Ibid., p. 19. 
 40 
 
fessional associations of Egypt, which represented a sort of 
proto-civil society within the authoritarian rule. The Brotherhood 
began to enter association elections, and succeeded in securing 
votes for its members in “ … Doctors’, Engineers’, Dentists’, 
Scientists’, Pharmacists’, and Journalists’ Associations elections, 
among others.”105 By penetrating these professional associations 
and using their resources to open schooling and training centers, 
the Muslim Brotherhood offered young graduates a level of op-
portunity and mobility that the state, despite its promises, was 
unable to match.  
Through their role in these professional associations, the 
Brotherhood gained new levels of access to their charitable activi-
ties, increasing involvement in “ …welfare societies, cultural or-
ganization, health clinics, and schools … as well as businesses en-
terprises … and investment companies.”106 This development 
came to be termed rise of Egypt’s “Islamic Sector,” and gave the 
Brotherhood a societal reach that paralleled that of the state. 
Through the “Islamic Sector,” the Brotherhood stated its “goal to 
reach out to the most marginalized people in society.”107 Through 
the Brotherhood’s assistance, feelings of deprivation regarding 
“education, career advancement, and material wealth diminished, 
along with the graduates’ feelings of disappointment and frustra-
tion.”108 Thus, the grievances which produced these feelings and 
expectations led people to what would ultimately coalesce into 
the Freedom and Justice party, a viable opposition to Mubarak 
and authoritarian rule. 
It was through its experience in the electoral campaigns of 
these professional associations that the notion of forming a po-
litical party first emerged.109 The organization first ran candidates 
in professional associations in 1984, and this was followed by par-
liamentary candidates in 1987, under the banner of the “Islamic 
Alliance.” The party received 17% of the total votes and won 60 
seats in parliament, demonstrating their popularity despite gov-
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ernment suppression and de facto illegal status. As the Egyptian 
economy waned in the 1990s and agreements between the regime 
and the IMF and World Bank forced further expenditure cuts, “ 
… the appeal of [the Muslim Brotherhood] was magnified under 
socioeconomic conditions in which conventional routes of self-
advancement were blocked.”110 Following an Engineers’ Associa-
tion election in 1991, a voter testified to this experience, com-
menting: “I voted for [the Muslim Brotherhood] … I support 
[them] because … they have a future-oriented point of view.”111 In 
response to their electoral success, Mubarak barred their partici-
pation in parliament in 1995, claiming that they were merely a ter-
rorist front. This failed to stem the tide of their growing success 
however, and running as independents, the organization seated 
112 candidates in that year’s election.  
As Egypt’s economy continued farther down the path of 
liberalization in the 2000s, the Brotherhood moved to fill the 
void of social expenditures created by the receding state. These 
efforts paid dividends in the 2005 parliamentary election, when 
the organization (running candidates as independents due to the 
ban) obtained 20% of the available seats. For “many political ob-
servers, the Brotherhood’s devotion to social work was the pri-
mary strength behind its remarkable results in [the elections].”112 
A report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs in 2006 titled “Social Programmes Bolster Appeal of Mus-
lim Brotherhood” echoed this sentiment, outlining the myriad of 
charitable activities of the brotherhood. According to the report, 
the organization operated “22 hospitals, [as well as maintaining] 
schools in every governate in the country.”113 In illuminating the 
high degree of support the organization offers to Egyptians, the 
report noted that “a woman would usually pay $875 to give birth 
in a private clinic, compared to just $175 in a [Muslim Brother-
hood] hospital.”114 
The Muslim Brotherhood implicitly acknowledged the 
importance of these programs, and aimed to institutionalize them 
in their 2007 party platform. The platform advocated “a strongly 
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interventionist state.”115 This is consistent with the charitable ac-
tivities they engaged in as an organization and political party, and 
in stark contrast to the ruling regime, which had systematically 
dissembled the interventions beginning with Sadat’s al-Infitah, 
and culminating with the IMF and World Bank agreements of 
Mubarak. During the campaign for presidency in 2012, Mr.Morsi 
explicitly acknowledged the importance of the economy in depos-
ing the regime, stating in an interview that the “ .. nature of the 
crisis” was that the regime had “ … failed miserably in its task of 
running the country.”116  
The Freedom and Justice party (the political wing of the 
Muslim Brotherhood) released an economic platform that further 
reinforces the notion that they represented a sharp economic di-
vergence from the regime, and that their election was a reflection 
of this importance in the eyes of the populace. In their policies, 
the party makes it clear that  
 
“ … Egypt’s main economic problems stem from high 
rates of poverty and unemployment … the widening gap 
between rich and poor, the increase in prices of basic 
goods, and the absence of social justice.”117 
 
These are precisely the symptoms that the Muslim Brotherhood 
attempted to combat through their charitable activities since their 
founding. Overall, the economic prescription of the party re-
verses several of the spending cuts implemented by the Mubarak 
regime, and represents a clearly different route than the one 
which had provoked such anger and resentment that culminated 
in the revolution. In 2011’s post-Mubarak elections, the Freedom 
and Justice party won 37.5% of the vote and 213 seats (see Fig.6 
below). 
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Fig. 6118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost immediately upon their founding, the Muslim 
Brotherhood assumed an important role in the economy of 
Egypt. The Nasser regime had staked its legitimacy upon its so-
cialist principles, but it was only through the Brotherhood’s inter-
vention in providing social services that the unrest of poverty was 
averted. This point indicates the correlation between these fac-
tors, with democratic freedoms conspicuously absent. Indeed, 
Nasser’s reign was as oppressive as his successors, but unrest was 
at its lowest. Though this cannot all be attributed to economic 
factors, the subsequent trends (socially and economically) dem-
onstrate a compelling correlation.  
With the introduction of al-Infitah by President Sadat, the 
basis of this legitimacy was broken. As Sadat cut social spending 
and entitlements, it was no longer possible to draw credibility 
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from investment in the people, and economic conditions exacer-
bated this political conundrum. In response, Sadat attempted to 
ease unrest by co-opting the economic success of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and integrating them into the mainstream. Like 
Nasser’s turn toward socialism before him, Sadat’s move indi-
cates the implicit correlation between economic conditions and 
unrest in Egypt. Sadat was forced to abandon this maneuver 
however when it became evident that the Brotherhood’s popular-
ity far exceeded his. To combat this political threat, he again insti-
tuted a ban on the organization. 
Egypt’s continued economic underperformance in the 
1980’s prompted further budgetary constraints, as well as eroded 
the earnings of the public sector – the historical safety valve for 
the combustible issue of unemployment. Mubarak was forced to 
agree to austerity measures in compliance with IMF and World 
Bank stipulations, and the trend that had favoured the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s increase in popularity continued. As the state cut 
back on subsidies, cut government wages, and struggled to deal 
with the inflation, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to fill the 
gaps by providing social services (medical and educational), es-
sential commodities at reduced prices (gas, food), and mobility 
options through the professional associations. These associations 
in particular helped gain support among the middle class, who 
were increasingly marginalized by the inability of the government 
to fulfil its full employment guarantee to university graduates. 
When the electoral system gradually opened, the Muslim 
Brotherhood was able to capitalize on the familiarity it had built 
among the Egyptian population over the preceding four decades. 
It had acted as a parallel actor to the state in the economy, and 
had made good on the bargain – the provision of basic services, 
food, and social mobility – that was promised by Nasser follow-
ing the 1954 coup. The Brotherhood appealed to all segments of 
society: they provided for the poor, gave jobs to the middle class, 
and even offered opportunity to the upper class, as attested to by 
millionaire businessman Hassan Malek who, in clarifying for his 
support of the Brotherhood, stated “[the Mubarak regime] al-
lowed me to reach a certain level (of economic activities and pro-
jects), but there was a ceiling.”119 
As the 2008 global economic recession deepened Egypt’s 
economic woes to untenable levels, the spark of revolution that 
began in Tunisia exploded in Cairo. When the dust settled, Muba-
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rak was gone, and the people were left to elect, for the first time, 
their own government. In doing so, they further illuminated pre-
cisely why they had erupted in furor to begin with. Had they 
sought Western-liberalism, they would have elected the New 
Wafd party. Were it in pursuit of Sharia law, the al-Nour party 
would rule Egypt today. Instead, they elected the Muslim Broth-
erhood, on the basis that it had demonstrated the ability to suc-
ceed where the state had always failed to fulfil their expectations: 
the economy.  
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5. The 1977 Bread Riots 
 
Prior to the 2011 uprising, there have been numerous incidents of 
dissent in Egypt with direct origins in mass feelings of economic 
deprivation. None, however, have had the psychological impact 
of the so-called “bread riots” of 1977. The large-scale outrage and 
violence that ensued when the Sadat regime attempted to cut 
subsidizes to flour and wheat foreshadowed the capacity for 
revolution should expectations be divorced from capability. In-
deed,  
“ … Egypt’s provision of subsidized bread in particular 
[had] become a powerful symbol of the broader social 
contract between the government and the population … 
political exclusion had gone hand in hand with [the] pub-
lic commitment to provide for the basic needs of the 
population.”120 
 
This chapter will explore this particular incident in depth. It will 
apply the concept of relative deprivation, and contextualize it 
within the basis of the regime’s claim to legitimacy. In exploring 
this vignette of Egyptian history, it will draw a connection be-
tween this outburst of violence, and that which occurred in 2011.  
Though food subsidies had existed under the monarchy, 
programs began in earnest under Nasser as part his stated objec-
tives to provide for all Egyptians, and raise the poorest out of 
poverty. As Nasser’s economic restructuring and investment in 
infrastructure produced growth in the 60’s, subsidy programs 
gained in urgency and importance as a mechanism to keep staple 
product costs down. Food subsidies were “ … part of a broader 
set of consumer welfare programs that also subsidized transport, 
housing, and some non-food consumer products …”121 
 Wheat subsidies in particular, however, became one of the 
more critical pillars of these policies. This development occurred 
for two particular reasons. First, Egypt’s largest provider of wheat 
imports, the United States, ceased its aid programs following 
Egypt’s war against Israel in 1967. Secondly, Nasser’s agrarian re-
forms seemed to reduce the efficacy and production of Egypt’s 
wheat production. Egypt’s “ …self-sufficiency … began to de-
cline in the 1960’s. Wheat imports began exceeding domestic 
production in 1963…”122 Due to this reliance on importation, 
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Egypt grew increasingly susceptible to price shocks. In the event 
of any disrupt in the global supply chain of wheat, for example, 
Egypt would be forced to pay the accompanying price increase – 
particularly in the absence of US aid programs.  
 This is precisely what occurred in the 1970’s. As the 
Egyptian consumer – particularly the large strata of poorer citi-
zens – was unable to bear the brunt of price increases, the gov-
ernment was forced to expand its subsidy programs and fill the 
gap between what the consumer could afford and what the mar-
ket was charging. The statistics bear out this dramatic increase in 
cost and expenditures: 
 
“ … World wheat prices skyrocketed from $60 a ton to 
$250 a ton by 1973, and Egypt’s wheat imports surged 
from $147 million to $400 million. Overall, expenditures 
on food subsidies jumped from 3 million [Egyptian 
pounds] in 1970/71 (only 0.2 percent of total government 
expenditure) to 1.4 billion [Egyptian pounds] in 1980/81, 
which accounted for 14% of total government expendi-
ture.”123 
 
As detailed in sub-chapter 3.3, Sadat was already encum-
bered by a deteriorating economy; oil revenues were down, the 
tax base had not expanded sufficiently to support the social wel-
fare programs, and there was a significant budget shortfall. It was 
these conditions that had led Sadat to implement al-Infitah, the 
intended restructuring of the Egyptian economy to make it more 
open to trade. In the short term however, his program had failed 
to alleviate the debt pressures. Sadat had no choice but to seek 
external help. The IMF extended its assistance, but it was contin-
gent on several prescriptive policy maneuvers, one of which in-
cluded a reduction in Egypt’s subsidy programs. Sadat felt he had 
no choice, and his administration acquiesced to the IMF’s de-
mands. The reaction was immediate: 
 
“On January 17, 1977, the government announced plans 
to cancel around 277 [Egyptian pounds] worth of subsi-
dies, especially on food, as well as the cancellation of bo-
nuses and pay raises for state employees … On the morn-
ing of the 18th workers in factories around Cairo walked 
out. At Helwan, an industrial city just south of the capital, 
workers rushed out of the factories and on to the streets 
in spontaneous demonstration against the government. 
Workers in Shoubra el Kheima, to the north of Cairo, did 
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much the same, in many places occupying their work-
places. Students of engineering at Ain Shams University 
held mass meetings and organised a march on parliament, 
which was joined by civil servants and students from 
Cairo University … Factory workers in Alexandria led 
demonstrations and strikes with support from students of 
Alexandria University, and in a few days unrest had 
spread to Mansoura, Quena, Suez, Aswan and many other 
urban areas around the country.”124 
 
In some places, the reaction was not as peaceful: 
 
 “Incidents of violence between protesters and the police 
increased, as did acts of sabotage. Railway lines were cut 
and tracks blocked, railway stations were set on fire and 
police stations attacked. Hotels, shops, casinos and upper-
class districts became targets of popular anger … In Hel-
wan, large-scale rioting broke out, with the railway lines 
between the city and Cairo being cut … Government 
buildings in Cairo were ransacked …”125 
 
The response was of such scope and intensity that the govern-
ment was forced to back down. Three days later, on January 20th, 
1977, it was announced that the subsidy cuts had been sus-
pended.  
 
5.1 An Explosion of Relative-Deprivation 
 
These mass demonstrations were not a spontaneous event; that 
they occurred all across Egypt and across professions testifies to 
that. Rather, it was the boiling over of pent-up frustrations 
stemming from feelings of inequity and lack of confidence in the 
government. What transpired on January 18-20th was actually part 
of a larger protest movement in response to the economic turbu-
lence of the Sadat era. In March of the previous year, workers in 
Damiette had demonstrated over unpaid wages, and in May 
workers in a military factory aggressively protested over wages.126 
These actions were repeated in several cities across Egypt, and 
prior to the bread riot explosions, culminated in a Cairo public 
transport workers striking out of disgust the day after Sadat was 
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re-elected with 99% approval.127 The public was responding to 
feelings of economic deprivation, but their mode of articulation 
emphasizes its relative nature. When a journalist stopped and 
asked a boy destroying a car during the bread riots “why are you 
burning your country?” he responded “it’s not mine, its 
[theirs]!”128 
 
Fig. 7129 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gurr’s analytical categories within his Relative Depriva-
tion Theory provide the tools to conceptually frame the riot and 
understand the boy’s sentiment. We can consider the outbursts a 
combination of “decremental deprivation” and “progressive dep-
rivation,” while the source of the value expectations is derived 
from all four categories of “past condition,” “abstract ideals,” 
“standards of a leader,” and “reference groups.”  
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The deprivation can be viewed as decremental, because in 
both the case of the striking factory workers and the bread riot 
participants, their expectations had previously been met. Their 
past condition was the primary source of their expectations, but 
over time the value diminished (subsidies were cut, wages were 
not paid). At the same time, we can consider them to be progres-
sive as well, as expectations of employment and subsistence were 
part of the social contract that underlay the basis of the regime’s 
legitimacy in the absence of democratization: its ability to provide 
for people.  
In this sense, abstract ideals and standards of a leader 
come in to play too. When the protesters demonstrated during 
the bread riots, they were heard “ … invoking Nasser’s name and 
chanting ‘Oh hero of the crossing, where is our breakfast?”130 
The idealism of Nasser’s socialist program and his professed 
standards were sources of expectations for them that had failed 
to be met. This sense of deprivation fuelled their anger, and con-
tributed to the violence that ensued.  
Finally, the category of “reference groups” is articulated 
by the boy’s statement “it’s not [his country] it’s [theirs]!” “They” 
is a reference group, and was in response to the regime. As 
Tammi Gutner notes in her paper on the political economy of 
food subsidy reform in Egypt,  
 
“ … the public perceived the changes to be [inequitable] 
… Although he riots are commonly termed ‘food riots,’ 
… they were in fact ‘equity riots’ since the underlying is-
sues had more to do with the perception that the policy 
change was unfair …”131 
 
Thus, we can see that several strands of analytical catego-
ries within Relative Deprivation Theory were typified in the bread 
riots of 1977. The Sadat regimes response implicitly acknowl-
edged this; in addition to cancelling the proposed reductions, they 
engaged in an expansionary subsidies policy, “in an effort to pla-
cate the public and counter widespread public criticism that his 
government was not doing enough to promote social equity.”132 
Sadat institutionalized this in the economic five year plan of 
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1978-82, in which he prioritized the government’s tasks as “ 
…[protecting] the consumer from price increases [and] to make 
available to the public necessary food items.”133 
The riots of 1977 were quelled in the short-term by Sa-
dat’s concessions, but the psychological scars bore by the regime 
lingered. Soon after acceding to the presidency Mubarak, too, was 
impelled by the IMF and World Bank to reduce subsidies. Wary 
of a repeat of the incident, his administration engaged in a grad-
ual reduction of subsidies over the course of the following two 
decades. While this presented the sort of immediate response 
witnessed in 1977, it had the same corresponding impact on the 
Egyptian people: grievances created, deprivation exacerbated, and 
values declining relative to expectation. It was only a matter time 
before these issues would again come to the forefront in mass 
demonstrations.  
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6. The Threshold – 2008’s Global Recession 
 
One of the most pertinent questions for any exploration of the 
origins of 2011’s revolution is a temporal one: why did the Egyp-
tian people, at that particular moment in time, rise up against the 
Mubarak regime? What was fundamentally different about 2011 
than 1977? Or 1981? Or 2002? In arguing that the cumulative 
economic situation is a significant part of the variable, 2008 
stands as a seminal moment. Egypt, like the rest of the world, was 
deeply impacted by the global economic recession. This chapter 
will explore precisely how the country was affected, and, drawing 
on the historical context and Relative Deprivation Theory, put 
forth an argument that in the recession the country lurched past 
an important threshold, after which it became significantly more 
likely that that the cumulative deprivations would coalesce into a 
social movement against the regime.  
 
 When looking at the various countries mobilized by the 
Arab Spring, Egypt’s revolution might, at first glance, appear to 
be unlikely. It had impressive GDP growth beginning in the sec-
ond half of the 2000’s, and its economic development, by this 
macro indicator, far exceeded countries like Yemen and Tunisia. 
On a microeconomic level however – one that considers labor, 
wages, and productivity – Egypt’s GDP masked significant inter-
nal problems that would rise to the surface in 2008. One prime 
symptom of these underlying issues was Egypt’s lagging Total 
Factor Productivity relative to GDP. Total Factor Productivity 
 
“ … embodies gains in output due to improvements in 
technological efficiency, as well as levels of education, 
worker motivation, levels of health and education and 
change in overall efficiency with which factors are allo-
cated in the production process.”134 
 
GDP growth without accompanying TFP growth makes a coun-
try particularly vulnerable to external shocks, as it reflects a popu-
lation that is not benefiting from whatever force is contributing 
most significantly to the GDP. In the case of Egypt, investment, 
rather than the manufacturing or agricultural sectors for example, 
was driving the economy. This was reflected in the persistently 
troublesome levels of unemployment, as well as stagnated wages 
amongst the employed.  
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Once the recession hit in earnest, Egypt’s unemployment 
reached epidemic levels. According to an ILO report, 
 
“The most immediate impact of the crisis has been the 
inability of the labor market to adjust, thus exacerbating 
the problem of unemployment, and accentuating the posi-
tion of different groups, particularly women and 
youth.”135  
 
This impacted not only Egyptians within Egypt, but the many 
who worked abroad and sent remittances home. As the economic 
malaise spread and the price of oil collapsed, Gulf countries laid 
off workers in the oil industry, and many Egyptians returned 
home unemployed, and without the prospect for employment. 
Between the second quarter of 2007 and the second quarter of 
2008, job opportunities decreased by 30%.136 
 In addition to the dramatic rise in unemployment, the 
2008 crisis seemed to disproportionately affect the youth. The  
 
“unemployment rates for the age groups 15-20 and 20-25 
who are new entrants to the labor market, amounted to 
22.2% and 28% respectively for the last quarter of 2008 
… in fact they were the two age groups where unem-
ployment rates went up as a result of the crisis … firs-
time-job-seekers [made] up 92% of total unemploy-
ment.”137  
 
This created a particularly combustible situation for Egypt, due to 
demographic trends that had been emerging since the 1970’s. In 
what is referred to as the “youth bulge,” Egypt (as well as many 
Middle Eastern countries) experienced a population boom that 
destabilized the generational balance. In 2008, a remarkable 54% 
of its population was under the age of 24.138 This, despite the re-
gime’s policy of full university employment, created a situation in 
which a large segment of the population had followed the pre-
scribed instructions for employment, and yet had failed to obtain 
a job.  
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 The second most important consequence of the 2008 
global recession Egypt was in the price of food. There are a vari-
ety of reasons why the price of food skyrocketed in the aftermath 
– a particularly tragic confluence of environmental factors and 
poor crop harvest among them – but one that is less often dis-
cussed is the inflationary consequences of the US monetary pol-
icy. In response to both tightened liquidity markets and decreas-
ing exports, the United States engaged in a policy of “quantitative 
easing,” in which they flooded the market with US dollars in an 
effort to increase loaning and spending, as well as devalue the 
dollar and make US exports more attractive. While this policy 
may indeed have benefited the US, it had a dramatic impact the 
price of food, as  
 
“ … [a] wave of speculative money [flowed] into com-
modities and gold, seeking protection against a declining 
U.S dollar … since the implementation of [quantitative 
easing round 2] in mid-2010, wheat and sugar prices … 
have gone through the roof.”139 
 
The impact of this was most dramatically realized when Mo-
hammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself afire in 
protest over Tunisian authorities harassment over his inability to 
afford the permit to operate his food cart. It was this event that 
ignited the flame of revolution in Tunisia, and that same flame 
soon blew toward Egypt. This was not an arbitrary development, 
but rather a reflection that the same conditions of escalating 
food-prices impacting Tunisians were endemic in Egypt, too. 
 The food subsidy program that had been a staple of 
Egyptian society since Nasser’s initiation of the program had all 
but disappeared by the time of the 2008 crisis. When price rose, 
“ … [it] had a direct and horrible effect on Egyptians living on 
the edge. Many of the poor got hungrier.”140 The poorest Egyp-
tians became unable to afford staple foodstuffs, and there no 
longer existed a welfare safety net to provide for them. For the 
middle class, the inflation in commodity prices converged with 
the stagnation of their wages, and life suddenly became signifi-
cantly more difficult.  
 When viewed through the lens of Relative Deprivation 
Theory, the level of anger directed at the regime during this par-
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ticular moment of crisis becomes more easy to understand. The 
unemployed youth endured decremental deprivation; their expec-
tations for employment remained constant, but value (a job) was 
not returned. The source of that value (the regime) therefore be-
came the target of their anger and frustration. This was com-
pounded by the fact that the unemployed are, by function of their 
unemployment, more readily available to mobilize for protest and 
demonstrations. 
 Those impacted by inflation, particularly in food, experi-
enced a similar level of decremental deprivation. All humans ex-
pect to be able to eat, so expectations of value are static in that 
regard, but similarly static is that the state will provide a stable set 
of conditions upon which to obtain food. Thus, in the same way, 
the regime acted as the source of those expectations, and again 
became the target of frustration and anger. This was com-
pounded by the dismantling of the social programs that had, in 
the past, provided a safety net in such a situation.  
 These deprivations were not only perceived as expecta-
tions relative to received value, but also as individual deprivation 
relative to fellow Egyptians – particularly members of the state 
apparatus who were beneficiaries of the policies that improved 
GDP, but failed to improve TFP. As Alaa Al-Aswany notes in his 
book On the State of Egypt: What Made the Revolution Inevitable, 
 
“ … [at the moment of revolution] Forty million Egyp-
tians, half the population, were living below the poverty 
line, on less than two dollars a day. Egypt was in decline 
by every measure: from public health and education to the 
economy and foreign policy. A few rich lived like kings in 
their palaces and resorts, moving around in private planes, 
while the poor unable to support their families were 
committing suicide or sometimes dying in the crush to 
obtain cheap bread or bottles of propane.”141 
 
Observers visiting Egypt noted the disparity as well. According to 
one report:  
 
 “ …the contrast between rich and poor was readily ap-
parent. On the road from Cairo to the new campus of American 
University New Cairo, gated communities with names like Bev-
erly Hills, Mayfair, and Le Reve are under construction, with 
stand-alone villas going for anywhere between $250,000 and well 
over $1 million … Meanwhile, in the small town of Darshour we 
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visited fourty kilometres south of Cairo, families lived in mud 
houses along potted dirt roads lined with garbage and raw sew-
age. They have few material possessions, apart from cellphones 
and television. In other words, while they are poor, they’re con-
nected to the outside world in unprecedented ways, reinforcing a 
sense of relative deprivation.”142 
 
Without this profound sense of inequitable economic depriva-
tion, it is unlikely that the frustrations of the Egyptian people 
would have coalesced into a social movement against the regime. 
The 2008 global recession however exacerbated the underlying 
tensions within Egyptian society (structural deficiencies produc-
ing unemployment, a neutered social safety net relative to the 
past) that downtrodden individuals, their expectations having 
been so spectacularly failed to be met, turned against the source 
of those failures, and the contrast in their positions. As noted 
above, the inter-connectedness through technology added a new 
dimension to relative, and Egyptians were made away not only 
how impoverished they were compared to others within the 
country, but also to others within the world. The compounding 
impact of this new global relative can be seen in how quickly the 
spirit of revolution spread from Tunisia to Egypt.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
Those who seek to refashion Egypt’s 2011 revolution in their im-
age by claiming that the revolution was the inevitable step toward 
a liberal democracy rob the Egyptian people of what is a signifi-
cantly more impressive feat than simply yielding to teleology. 
When contextualized on the backdrop of the three post-
monarchy regimes, what is revealed is a population negotiating 
the basis under which it consents to be governed. While some 
may struggle that this basis is not necessarily that of their own, it 
is precisely that egoistic hubris that is responsible for the shame-
ful past of colonialism and imperialism, and from which, painful 
as it may be, we face an intellectual obligation to move away 
from. In doing so we not only restore agency to the Egyptian 
people, but dignity as well.  
 It has been the attempt of this thesis to move away from 
the hackneyed explanations of modernization theory, and instead 
propose a narrative that contextualizes the revolution within the 
graduated stages of the economic development of the Nasser, 
Sadat, and Mubarak regime’s, and the associated feelings of dep-
rivation fomented when expectations that underlay the legitimacy 
of a each respective regime’s reign were not met. Nasser came to 
power on the wings of his anti-colonial credentials, but the po-
tential for social unrest in the face of poverty soon necessitated a 
social contract to legitimize his rule. This was articulated his so-
cialist agenda, whereby he assumed a patriarchal role in providing 
for the Egyptian people. His extensive agrarian reform sought to 
address the relative deprivation the masses had always felt toward 
the landed elite, and quelled social tensions by actively invested in 
the egalitarian ideal. In this regard he was quite successful, as 
Egypt experienced unprecedented levels of growth, and the most 
impoverished did, by and large, see their lot improve. While the 
Muslim Brotherhood represented an opposition to the status quo 
from the very beginning, they remained ideologically stunted by 
the era’s socioeconomics.  
 Nasser’s agenda began to crumble in the face of over am-
bition, however. His efforts at restructuring Egypt’s internal dy-
namics were paralleled by his attempts to posture it on the world-
stage, and ultimately his failure in that regard proved his undoing. 
Drained of resources by defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, his 
social project soon experienced budgetary deficiencies, and basic 
economics necessitated a departure from socialist ideals. Nasser 
passed away before he became culpable, however, and the unen-
viable task of renegotiating the basis of authoritarian rule without 
accompanying economic growth fell to his successor, Anwar Sa-
dat.  
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 When Sadat came to power, he inherited an economy that 
had overextended itself, and could no longer afford to fund the 
mechanisms by which his rule was legitimized. Recognizing the 
growing popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, he sought to co-
opt their economic success through the appeal of Islam. In this 
way he mistook the source of their popularity; it was not that 
people were drawn to the Brotherhood’s particular vision of Is-
lam and then made use of their social expenditures, but the other 
way around. The organization succeeded in penetrating the con-
sciousness of the Egyptian people because they succeeded where 
the state did not. In effect, they fulfilled the ideals of Nasser 
where Nasser himself was unable to. While the state promised the 
feed, shelter, and provide mobility, it was the Muslim Brother-
hood who increasingly was able to.  
 Sadat’s al-Infitah, then, would prove fatal to the regime. 
Egypt had consented to be governed under specific terms, and al-
Infitah attempted to re-write those terms without consultation. 
This attempt was most dramatically embodied by the aborted 
subsidy cuts that, when proposed, produced such a violent reac-
tion the regime was forced to repeal them in only three days. The 
Egyptian people clung strongly to the source of their value expec-
tations – their previous condition in receiving those expectations, 
and the ideals (of socialism) that created them.  
 Mubarak raced much the same difficulties as Sadat, but 
had learned from the Bread Riot of 1977. Rather than engage in a 
sudden overhaul of the social contract, his regime made gradual 
changes. It produced the desired result in that violent outbursts 
on the scale of the Bread Riot were averted, but it created an un-
desirable situation in which the benefits of his economic program 
were hoarded by those closest to its creation. The regime and its 
businessmen cronies grew rich, the GDP grew, and yet the Egyp-
tian people remained largely impoverished. The structural defi-
ciency of his efforts necessitated the maintenance of Nasser’s 
full-university graduate employment program, but the recipients 
of this aid experienced stagnation in earnings and opportunity.  
 All the while, in parallel to this process, the Muslim 
Brotherhood made good on their promises. As the state receded 
from economic activities it had traditionally reserved for itself, 
the Brotherhood moved to fill the vacuum. When subsidies were 
cut, they provided markets with discounted products. When in-
frastructure divestment led to crumbling hospitals and schools, 
they created their own network of these services. And when 
young university students waited for the government to create 
opportunities for them, the Brotherhood empowered them 
through professional associations, creating the level of mobility 
they had been promised. In effect, the Muslim Brotherhood be-
 59 
 
came what the state had been. In doing so, it became a viable ac-
tor to replace the state. It would take an event of significant mag-
nitude to lurch the entrenched state apparatus, however. The 
2008 economic recession served that purpose. 
 When the economy rapidly deteriorated, the problems 
that had been brewing under the surface were quickly revealed. 
Unemployment, which had always been a lingering problem, ex-
ploded as state was unable to offer jobs to the largest demo-
graphic – the under 25 age group. The regime was also saddled 
with a problem not of its own creation in the dramatically escalat-
ing price of foodstuffs and propane. Their dismantling of the 
subsidy system and other aspects of the social safety net created 
by Nasser exacerbated the problem, however, and it became in-
creasingly evident the degree to which Mubarak’s legitimacy was 
undermined by his inability to provide economic opportunity for 
the Egyptian people. Equally problematic was the visibility of the 
minority who had been enriched through the process of eco-
nomic liberalization. 
 These two strands met and produced distinct feelings of 
relative deprivation in the population. Egyptians of all ages and 
classes felt their expectations, created through prior experience 
under a more socialist system (subsidies), the explicit promises of 
the regime (full employment), or the very nature of their consent 
to be ruled (a state that will provide for them) diverged signifi-
cantly from the value returned on these expectations. Frustration 
boiled over, and when revolution hit Tunisia, Egyptians felt com-
pelled to act as well. Their feelings of deprivation were not only 
relative to other Egyptians – as they had been in the 1977 food 
riots, for example – but relative to all whom they were connected 
to via mobile phones, television, and the internet. This new global 
aspect of relative deprivation allowed for the quick transmission 
of the revolutionary atmosphere to Egypt. Integrating the experi-
ence of Tunisians into their own, Egyptians took to the streets, 
and a short month later, Mubarak was gone, the regime deposed, 
and the opportunity to forge a new basis of consent between the 
people and government was created. 
It was their demonstrated ability to deliver what the state 
had promised that produced an electoral landslide for the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Where expectations of value had gone unmet, the 
organization demonstrated an ability to correct that deprivation. 
Their election represents not a turn toward religious radicalism, 
but toward a certain practicality; they had, for many people, long 
fulfilled the function of the state. Whether or not they will be 
successful in that role is a question that has yet to be answered. It 
is, as of now, unclear whether the economic concerns that helped 
prompt their election will retain pre-eminence in the minds of 
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those who took to the streets in January 2011 to dispose a regime 
that had failed so spectacularly in that regard.  
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